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AGREEMENT

This Agreement is entered into by the Attorney General of the State of Maine and Down
East Community Hospital (“the Hospital”).
In consideration of the covenants expressed herein, the parties agree that:
GENERAL
A.

Background.

The Hospital is a non-profit community-based hospital that depends

on the financial support and goodwill of the community it serves. The Board of Directors of the
Hospital is composed of local citizens who willingly volunteer their time to ensure that the
Hospital combines the best of patient care with good stewardship of the community’s limited
financial resources. The Hospital’s Board takes its governance role seriously.
As part of his ongoing responsibility to enforce Maine’s antitrust laws, the Attorney
General has been reviewing activities undertaken by the Hospital through the Maine Health
Alliance, of which the Hospital is a member, in contracting with third party payors for hospital
services. In order to ensure that the Hospital functions within the proper scope of all. applicable
guidelines, the Hospital undertakes the commitments set forth below.
B.

Effect. Acceptance and implementation of this Agreement by the Attorney General

and the Hospital shall not be considered to be an admission or concession of any violation of law
or of any liability or wrongdoing. No part of this Agreement constitutes evidence against the
Hospital in any action brought by any person or entity for any violation of law, except an action to
enforce the terms of this Agreement.
HOSPITAL COMMITMENTS
The Hospital will not, directly or indirectly or through any corporate or other device, in
connection with the provision of hospital services:
1.
Enter into, adhere to, participate in, maintain, organize, implement, enforce or
otherwise facilitate any unlawful combination, conspiracy, agreement, or understanding between
or among any hospitals with whom the Hospital competes:
a.

To negotiate on behalf of any hospital with any payor;

b.

To deal, refuse to deal, or threaten to refuse to deal with any payor;

c.

Regarding any term, condition, or requirement upon which any hospital
deals, or is willing to deal, with any payor, including, but not limited to,
price terms; or

d.

Not to deal individually with any payor, or not to deal with any payor
through any arrangement other than the Maine Health Alliance;

2.
Exchange or facilitate in any unlawful manner the exchange or transfer of
information among hospitals concerning any hospital’s willingness to deal with a payor, or the
terms or conditions, including price terms, on which the hospital is willing to deal with a payor;
3.

Attempt to engage in any action set forth in Paragraphs 1 or 2 above; or

4.
Encourage, suggest, advise, pressure, induce, or attempt to induce any person to
engage in any action set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 3 above.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that, nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit any agreement
involving, or conduct by the Hospital that:

(i) is otherwise lawful; (ii) complies with the

Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care issued jointly by the U.S. Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission; or (iii) is reasonably necessary to form, participate
in, or take any action in furtherance of a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement (as defined herein), and so long as the arrangement does not
restrict the ability, or facilitate the refusal, of hospitals or physicians who participate in it to deal
with payors on an individual basis or through any other arrangement.
For purposes of this Agreement:
“Qualified clinically-integrated joint arrangement’’ means an arrangement to provide
physician services, hospital services, or both physician and hospital services in which:
1. all physicians and hospitals who participate in the arrangement participate in
active and ongoing programs of the arrangement to evaluate and modify the
practice patterns of, and create a high degree of interdependence and
cooperation among, the physicians and hospitals who participate in the
arrangement, in order to control costs and ensure the quality of services
provided through the arrangement; and
2. any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing entered
into by or within the arrangement is reasonably necessary to obtain significant
efficiencies through the arrangement.
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"Qualified risk-sharing jo int arrangement” means an arrangement to provide physician
services, hospital services, or both physician and hospital services in which:

1. all physicians and hospitals who participate in the arrangement share substantial
financial risk through their participation in the arrangement and thereby create
incentives for the physicians and hospitals who participate jointly to control
costs and improve quality by managing the provision of physician and hospital
services such as risk-sharing involving:
a. the provision of physician or hospital services to payors at a capitated rate,
b. the provision of physician or hospital services for a predetermined
percentage of premium or revenue from payors,
c. the use of significant financial incentives (e.g., substantial withholds) for
physicians or hospitals who participate to achieve, as a group, specified
cost-containment goals, or
d. the provision of a complex or extended course of treatment that requires the
substantial coordination of care by hospitals or physicians in different
specialties offering a complementary mix of services, for a fixed,
predetermined price, when the costs of that course of treatment for any
individual patient can vary greatly due to the individual patient’s condition,
the choice, complexity, or length of treatment, or other factors; and
2. any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing entered
into by or within the arrangement is reasonably necessary to obtain significant
efficiencies through the arrangement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A.

The Attorney General agrees by execution hereof that this Agreement constitutes a

complete settlement and release on behalf of the State of Maine against the Hospital with respect
to any claims, causes of action, damages, fines, costs and penalties which were or could have been
asserted prior to the effective date of this Agreement based upon the activities of the Maine Health
Alliance.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Attorney General may institute an action or

proceeding to enforce the terms and provisions of the Agreement or take action based on future
conduct.
B.

This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the parties hereto and

supersedes all prior agreements or understandings, whether written or oral, between the parties
with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement.
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ENTERED into on behalf of DOWN EAST CO:
Dated:

£ —2 '-j ~ 03

iITY/|iOSPITAL by:

(
Wayne Dodwell, Chief Executive Officer

ENTERED into on behalf of the STATE OF MAINE by:
G. STEVEN ROWE
Attorney General

Dated:

t/ '

>
CHRISTINA M. MOYLAN
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207)626-8800
Maine Bar No. 7095
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AGREEMENT

This Agreement is entered into by the Attorney General of the State of Maine and Hospital
Administrative District No. 4 d/b/a Mayo Regional Hospital (“the Hospital”).
In consideration of the covenants expressed herein, the parties agree that:
GENERAL
A.

Background.

The Hospital is a public community-based hospital that depends on

the financial support and goodwill of the community it serves. The Board of Directors of the
Hospital is composed of local citizens who are elected to the Board by the town meetings of the
towns that are members of Hospital Administrative District No. 4, and who willingly volunteer
their time to ensure that the Hospital combines the best of patient care with good stewardship of
the community’s limited financial resources. The Hospital’s Board takes its governance role
seriously.
As part of his ongoing responsibility to enforce Maine’s antitrust laws, the Attorney
General has been reviewing activities undertaken by the Hospital through the Maine Health
Alliance, of which the Hospital is a member, in contracting with third paity payors for hospital
services. In order to ensure that the Hospital functions within the proper scope of all applicable
guidelines, the Hospital undertakes the commitments set forth below.
B.

Effect. Acceptance and implementation of this Agreement by the Attorney General

and the Hospital shall not be considered to be an admission or concession of any violation of law
or of any liability or wrongdoing. No part of this Agreement constitutes evidence against the
Hospital in any action brought by any person or entity for any violation of law, except an action to
enforce the terms of this Agreement.
HOSPITAL COMMITMENTS
The Hospital will not, directly or indirectly or through any corporate or other device, in
connection with the provision of hospital services:
1.
Enter into, adhere to, participate in, maintain, organize, implement, enforce or
otherwise facilitate any unlawful combination, conspiracy, agreement, or understanding between
or among any hospitals with whom the Hospital competes:
a.

To negotiate on behalf of any hospital with any payor;

b.

To deal, refuse to deal, or threaten to refuse to deal with any payor;

c.

Regarding any term, condition, or requirement upon which any hospital
deals, or is willing to deal, with any payor, including, but not limited to,
price terms; or

d.

Not to deal individually with any payor, or not to deal with any payor
through any arrangement other than the Maine Health Alliance;

2.
Exchange or facilitate in any unlawful manner the exchange or transfer of
information among hospitals concerning any hospital’s willingness to deal with a payor, or the
terms or conditions, including price terms, on which the hospital is willing to deal with a payor;
3.

Attempt to engage in any action set forth in Paragraphs 1 or 2 above; or

4.
Encourage, suggest, advise, pressure, induce, or attempt to induce any person to
engage in any action set forth in Paragraphs 1 through 3 above.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that, nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit any agreement
involving, or conduct by the Hospital that:

(i) is otherwise lawful; (ii) complies with the

Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care issued jointly by the U.S. Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission; or (iii) is reasonably necessary to form, participate
in, or take any action in furtherance of a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement (as defined herein), and so long as the arrangement does not
restrict the ability, or facilitate the refusal, of hospitals or physicians who participate in it to deal
with payors on an individual basis or through any other arrangement.
For purposes of this Agreement:
“Qualified clinically-integrated, joint arrangement’’ means an arrangement to provide
physician services, hospital services, or both physician and hospital services in which:
1. all physicians and hospitals who participate in the arrangement participate in
active and ongoing programs of the arrangement to evaluate and modify the
practice patterns of, and create a high degree of interdependence and
cooperation among, the physicians and hospitals who participate in the
arrangement, in order to control costs and ensure the quality of services
provided through the arrangement; and
2. any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing entered
into by or within the arrangement is reasonably necessary to obtain significant
efficiencies through the arrangement.
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“Qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement” means an arrangement to provide physician
services, hospital services, or both physician and hospital services in which:

1. all physicians and hospitals who participate in the arrangement share substantial
financial risk through their participation in the arrangement and thereby create
incentives for the physicians and hospitals who participate jointly to control
costs and improve quality by managing the provision of physician and hospital
services such as risk-sharing involving:
a. the provision of physician or hospital services to payors at a capitated rate,
b. the provision of physician or hospital services for a predetermined
percentage of premium or revenue from payors,
c. the use of significant financial incentives (e.g., substantial withholds) for
physicians or hospitals who participate to achieve, as a group, specified
cost-containment goals, or
d. the provision of a complex or extended course of treatment that requires the
substantial coordination of care by hospitals or physicians in different
specialties offering a complementary mix of services, for a fixed,
predetermined price, when the costs of that course of treatment for any
individual patient can vary greatly due to the individual patient’s condition,
the choice, complexity, or length of treatment, or other factors; and
2. any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing entered
into by or within the arrangement is reasonably necessary to obtain significant
efficiencies through the arrangement.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
A.

The Attorney General agrees by execution hereof that this Agreement constitutes a

complete settlement and release on behalf of the State of Maine against the Hospital with respect
to any claims, causes of action, damages, fines, costs and penalties which were or could have been
asserted prior to the effective date of this Agreement based upon the activities of the Maine Health
Alliance.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Attorney General may institute an action or

proceeding to enforce the terms and provisions of the Agreement or take action based on future
conduct.
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B.

This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the parties hereto and

supersedes all prior agreements or understandings, whether written or oral, between the parties
with respect to the subject matter of this Agreement.

ENTERED into on behalf of HOSPITAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT No. 4 d/b/a MAYO
REGIONAL HOSPITAL
by:
Dated: June 18, 2003
Ralph Gabarra, CEO

ENTERED into on behalf of the STATE OF MAINE by:
G. STEVEN ROWE
Attorney General

Dated:
CHRISTINA M. MOYLAN
U
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207)626-8800
Maine Bar No. 7095
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO. ^ /¿ > 3 '/3 5

STATE OF MAINE,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff
v.

)

THE MAINE HEALTH ALLIANCE,
a Maine Nonprofit Corporation with Offices in
Bangor, Penobscot County, Maine;
and WILLIAM R. DIGGINS,
individually,
Defendants

CONSENTORDER

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff State of Maine, having filed its Complaint on

I X.^ ?<rdT> , and Plaintiff and

Defendants The Maine Health Alliance (Alliance), and William R. Diggins having consented to
the entry of this Consent Order without trial or adjudication of any issue of fact or law herein and
without this Order constituting any evidence against, or an admission by, any party with respect to
such issues;
NOW, THEREFORE, before the taking of any testimony and without trial or adjudication
of any issue of fact or law herein, and upon consent of the parties hereto, it is hereby ORDERED
and DECREED as follows:
I. JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff and Defendants and the subject matter of this
action. The Complaint states a claim for relief under 10 M.R.S.A. § 1101 and 1104.
II. DEFINITIONS
In this Consent Order, the following definitions shall apply:

State o f Maine v. The Maine Healh.. Jliance et al.
Consent Order

A.
“Defendant Alliance” means The Maine Health Alliance, its officers, directors,
employees, agents, attorneys, representatives, successors, and assigns; and the subsidiaries,
divisions, groups, and affiliates controlled by it, and the respective officers, directors, employees,
agents, attorneys, representatives, successors, and assigns of each.
B.

“Defendant Diggins” means William R. Diggins.

C.

“Defendants” means Defendant Alliance and Defendant Diggins.

D.

“Hospital” means a health care facility licensed by the State of Maine as a hospital.

E.
“Hospital system” means an organization comprised of two or more hospitals
where the same person or persons control each hospital in the organization. For purposes of this
definition, the definition of the term “control” under 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b) shall apply. Hospital
system includes a hospital that is managed under contract, or is leased, by another hospital.
F.
“Medical group practice” means a bona fide, integrated firm in which physicians
practice medicine together as partners, shareholders, owners, members, or employees, or in which
only one physician practices medicine.
G.
“Participate” in an entity means (1) to be a partner, shareholder, owner, member, or
employee of such entity, or (2) to provide services, agree to provide services, or offer to provide
services, to a payor through such entity. This definition applies to all tenses and forms of the word
“participate,” including, but not limited to, “participating,” “participated,” and “participation.”
H
“Payor” means any person that pays, or arranges for payment, for all or any part of
any physician or hospital services for itself or for any other person. Payor includes any person that
develops, leases, or sells access to networks of physicians or hospitals.
I.
“Person” means both natural persons and artificial persons, including, but not
limited to, corporations, unincorporated entities, and governments.
J.
“Physician” means a doctor of allopathic medicine (“M.D.”) or a doctor of
osteopathic medicine (“D.O.”).
K.
“Preexisting Contract” means a contract that was in effect on the date of the receipt
by a payor that is a party to such contract of notice sent by Defendant Alliance, pursuant to
Paragraph 111(E)(1)(b) of this Order, of such payor’s right to terminate such contract.
L.
“Principal Address” means either (1) primary business address, if there is a
business address, or (2) primary residential address, if there is no business address.
M.
“Qualified clinically-integrated joint arrangement” means an arrangement to
provide physician services, hospital sendees, or both physician and hospital services in which:

State o f Maine v. The Maine Healh. alliance et al.
Consent Order

1. all physicians and hospitals who participate in the arrangement participate in
active and ongoing programs of the arrangement to evaluate and modify the
practice patterns of, and create a high degree of interdependence and
cooperation among, the physicians and hospitals who participate in the
arrangement, in order to control costs and ensure the quality of services
provided through the arrangement; and
2. any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing entered
into by or within the arrangement is reasonably necessary to obtain significant
efficiencies through the arrangement.
N.
“Qualified risk-sharing j oint arrangement” means an arrangement to provide
physician sendees, hospital services, or both physician and hospital services in which:
1. all physicians and hospitals who participate in the arrangement share substantial
financial risk through their participation in the arrangement and thereby create
incentives for the physicians and hospitals who participate jointly to control
costs and improve quality by managing the provision of physician and hospital
services such as risk-sharing involving:
a. the provision of physician or hospital services to payors at a capitated rate,
b. the provision of physician or hospital services for a predetemiined
percentage of premium or revenue from payors,
c. the use of significant financial incentives (e.g., substantial withholds) for
physicians or hospitals who participate to achieve, as a group, specified
cost-containment goals, or
d. the provision of a complex or extended course of treatment that requires the
substantial coordination of care by hospitals or physicians in different
specialties offering a complementary mix of services, for a fixed,
predetermined price, when the costs of that course of treatment for any
individual patient can vary greatly due to the individual patient’s condition,
the choice, complexity, or length of treatment, or other factors; and
2. any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing entered
into by or within the arrangement is reasonably necessary to obtain significant
efficiencies through the arrangement.
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State o f Maine v. The Maine Health, illiance et al.
Consent Order

III. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants, directly or indirectly or through any
corporate or other device, in connection with the provision of physician sendees, are hereby
permanently enjoined pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1104 from:
1.
Entering into, adhering to, participating in, maintaining, organizing, implementing,
enforcing, or otherwise facilitating any combination, conspiracy, agreement, or understanding
between or among any physicians:
a. To negotiate on behalf of any physician with any payor;
b. To deal, refuse to deal, or threaten to refuse to deal with any payor;
c. Regarding any term, condition, or requirement upon which any physician deals,
or is willing to deal, with any payor, including, but not limited to, price terms;
or
d. Not to deal individually with any payor, or not to deal with any payor through
any arrangement other than Defendant Alliance;
2.
Exchanging or facilitating in any manner the exchange or transfer of information
among physicians concerning any physician’s willingness to deal with a payor, or the terms or
conditions, including price terms, on which the physician is willing to deal with a payor;
3. Attempting to engage in any action prohibited by Paragraphs 111(A)(1) or 111(A)(2)
above; and
4. Encouraging, suggesting, advising, pressuring, inducing, or attempting to induce any
person to engage in any action that would be prohibited by Paragraphs 111(A)(1) through 111(A)(3)
above.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that, nothing in this Paragraph 111(A) shall prohibit any
agreement involving, or conduct by:
(i)

Defendant Diggins that is reasonably necessary to form, participate in, or take any
action in furtherance of a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement, or that solely involves physicians in the
same medical group practice; or

(ii)

Defendant Alliance that is reasonably necessary to form, participate in, or take any
action in furtherance of a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement, and so long as the arrangement does not
restrict the ability, or facilitate the refusal, of physicians who participate in it to deal
with payors on an individual basis or through any other arrangement.
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B.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants, directly or indirectly or through any
corporate or other device, in connection with the provision of hospital services, are hereby
permanently enjoined pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1104 from:
1.
Entering into, adhering to, participating in, maintaining, organizing, implementing,
enforcing, or otherwise facilitating any combination, conspiracy, agreement, or understanding
between or among any hospitals:
a.

To negotiate on behalf of any hospital with any payor;

b.

To deal, refuse to deal, or threaten to refuse to deal with any payor;

c.

Regarding any term, condition, or requirement upon which any hospital
deals, or is willing to deal, with any payor, including, but not limited to,
price terms; or

d.

Not to deal individually with any payor, or not to deal with any payor
through any arrangement other than Defendant Alliance;

2.
Exchanging or facilitating in any manner the exchange or transfer of information
among hospitals concerning any hospital’s willingness to deal with a payor, or the terms or
conditions, including price terms, on which the hospital is willing to deal with a payor;
3.
above; and

Attempting to engage in any action prohibited by Paragraphs 111(B)(1) or 111(B)(2)

4.
Encouraging, suggesting, advising, pressuring, inducing, or attempting to induce
any person to engage in any action that would be prohibited by Paragraphs 111(B)(1) through
111(B)(3) above.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that, nothing in this Paragraph 111(B) shall prohibit any
agreement involving, or conduct by:
(i)

Defendant Diggins that is reasonably necessary to form, participate in, or take any
action in furtherance of a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement, or that solely involves hospitals in the same
hospital system; or

(ii)

Defendant Alliance that is reasonably necessary to form, participate in, or take any
action in furtherance of a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement, and so long as the arrangement does not
restrict the ability, or facilitate the refusal, of hospitals who participate in it to deal
with payors on an individual basis or through any other arrangement.

State o f Maine v. The Maine HeaL. Alliance et al.
Consent Order

C.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Alliance shall copy the Maine Department
of Attorney General with any Notification provided to the Federal Trade Commission prior to
Alliance’s negotiating or entering into agreements with payors.
D.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Diggins, for a period of three (3) years
from the date that this Order becomes final, directly or indirectly or through any corporate or other
device, in connection with the provision of physician or hospital services, is hereby permanently
enjoined pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1104 from:
1.
Negotiating with any payor on behalf of any physician or hospital who participates,
or has participated, in Defendant Alliance, notwithstanding whether such conduct also is
prohibited by Paragraph 111(A) or Paragraph III(B) of this Order; and
2.
Advising any physician or hospital who participates, or has participated, in
Defendant Alliance to accept or reject any term, condition, or requirement of dealing with any
payor, notwithstanding whether such conduct also is prohibited by Paragraph 111(A) or Paragraph
III(B) of this Order.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, nothing in this paragraph III(D) shall prohibit Defendant
Diggins .from- forming, participating in, or taking.any action in furtherance of a qualified r i s k r _
sharing joint arrangement or qualified clinically-integrated joint arrangement on behalf of the
Alliance.
E.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Alliance shall:
1.

Within thirty (30) days after the date on which this Order becomes final:

a.

send by first-class mail, with delivery confirmation, a copy of this Order and the
Complaint to:
i.

each physician and hospital who participates, or has participated, in Defendant
Alliance, and

ii. each officer, director, manager, and employee of Defendant Alliance;
b.

send by first class, mail return receipt requested, copies of this Order, the
Complaint, and the notice specified in Appendix A to this Order to the chief
executive officer of each payor that contracts with Defendant Alliance for the
provision of physician or hospital services;

2.
Terminate, without penalty or charge, and in compliance with any applicable laws
of the State of Maine, any Preexisting Contract with any payor for the provision of physician or
hospital sendees, at the earlier of: (1) receipt by Defendant Alliance of a written request to
terminate such contract from any payor that is a party to the contract; or (2) the termination or
renewal date (including any automatic renewal date) of such contract; provided, however, a
Preexisting Contract may extend beyond the termination or renewal date for a maximum of one
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year if the payor provides written affirmation of the preexisting contract prior to the termination or
renewal date, and Defendant Alliance has determined not to exercise its right to terminate pursuant
to the terms of the preexisting agreement;
3.

For a period of three (3) years from the date this Order becomes final:
a. Distribute by first class mail, return receipt requested, a copy of this Order and
the Complaint to:

_

(i)

each physician or hospital who begins participating in Defendant
Alliance, and who did not previously receive a copy of this Order and the
Complaint from Defendant Alliance, within thirty (30) days of the time
that such participation begins;

(ii)

each payor that contracts with Defendant Alliance for the provision of
physician or hospital services, and that did not previously receive a copy
of this Order and the Complaint from Defendant Alliance, within thirty
(30) days of the time that such payor enters into such contract; and

.... (iii). each person who becomes arLofficer, .director, manager, or employee.of.
Defendant Alliance, and who did not previously receive a copy of this
Order and the Complaint from Defendant AJliance, within thirty (30) days
of the time that he or she assumes such responsibility with Defendant
Alliance; and
b. Annually publish in an official annual report or newsletter sent to all physicians
and hospitals who participate in Defendant Alliance, a copy of this Order and
the Complaint with such prominence as is given to regularly featured articles;

4.
Notify the Maine Office of the Attorney General at least thirty (30) days prior to
any proposed change in Defendant Alliance, such as dissolution, assignment, sale resulting in the
emergence of a successor company or corporation, the creation or dissolution of subsidiaries, or
any other change in Defendant Alliance that may affect compliance obligations arising out of this
Order; and
5.
File verified written reports within sixty (60) days after the date this Order becomes
final, annually thereafter for three (3) years on the anniversary of the date this Order becomes
final, and at such other times as the Maine Office of the Attorney General may by written notice
require. Each report shall include:
a. a detailed description of the manner and form in which Defendant Alliance has
complied and is complying with this Order;
b. the name, address, and telephone number of each payor with which Defendant
Alliance has had any contact; and
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c. delivery confirmations required by Paragraph 111(E)(1)(a), and copies- of the
signed return receipts required by Paragraphs 111(E)(1)(b) and 111(E)(3)(a).
F.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Diggins shall:

1.
For a period of three (3) years after the date this Order becomes final, distribute by
first class mail, return receipt requested, a copy of this Order and the Complaint to:
a. all physician groups, hospital groups, and physician-hospital organizations,
other than any medical group practice or hospital system, that Defendant
Diggins represents for the purpose of contracting, or seeking to contract, with
payors for the provision of physician or hospital services, or that Defendant
Diggins advises with regard to their dealings with payors in connection with the
provision of physician or hospital services, within (30) days of the time that
Defendant Diggins begins providing such representation or advice, unless such
physician group, hospital group, or physician-hospital organization previously
received a copy of this Order and the Complaint from Defendant Alliance, or
Defendant Diggins, and
.................. _... lx each.p_ayor.with which-Defendant Diggins deals, or has dealt, for the purpose of.
contracting, or seeking to contract, while representing or advising any physician
groups, hospital groups, or physician-hospital organizations, other than any
medical group practice or hospital system, with regard to their dealings
regarding contracting with such payor for the provision of physician or hospital
services, within thirty (30) days of such dealing, unless such payor previously
received a copy of this Order and the Complaint from Defendant Alliance or
Defendant Diggins;
1.
File verified written reports within sixty (60) days after the date this. Order
becomes final, annually thereafter for three (3) years on the anniversary of the date this Order
becomes final, and at such other times as the Maine Office of the Attorney General may by
written notice require; setting forth:
a. in detail, the manner and form in which Defendant Diggins has complied and is
complying with this Order;
b. the name, address, and telephone number of each physician, hospital, group of
physicians or hospitals, or physician-hospital organization that Defendant
Diggins has represented or advised with respect to their dealings with any payor
in connection with the provision of physician or hospital services;
c. the name, address, and telephone number of each payor with which Defendant
Diggins has dealt while representing any physician, hospital, group of
physicians or hospitals, or physician-hospital organization in connection with
fne provision of physician or hospital services; and
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Jliance et al.

d. copies of the signed return receipt required by this Paragraph 111(F)(1).
G.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each Defendant shall notify the Maine Office of the
Attorney General of any change in his or its respective Principal Address within twenty (20) days
of such change in address.
H.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the purpose of determining or securing
compliance with this Order, Defendants shall permit any duly authorized representative of the
Maine Office of the Attorney General:
1.
Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to inspect and copy all
books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, calendars, and other records and
documents in their possession, or under their control, relating to any matter contained in this
Order;
2.
Upon five (5) days’ notice to Defendant Alliance, and in the presence of counsel,
and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers, directors, or employees of
Defendant Alliance; and
3,.... Upon.five.(5)..days’ notice.to Defendant Dfggins, and in .the presence of counsel,
and without restraint or interference from such Defendant, to interview such Defendant or the
employees of such Defendant.
IV. COSTS
Defendants shall pay to the State of Maine the amount of $17,500 for State's attorney's fees
and costs in this matter pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1104.
V. RETENTION OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is retained by the Court for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to this
Consent Order to apply to this Court at any time for such further orders or directions as may be
necessary or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of the Consent Order, for
modifications of or termination of any of the provisions hereof, and for the enforcement of
compliance herewith.
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State of Maine v. The Maine HeaU. .dliance et al.
Consent Order

CONSENTED to on behalf of the STATE OF MAINE by:
G. STEVEN ROWE
Attorney General

Dated:

Jui/vn

, ~Z- o P
CHRISTINA M. MOYLAN
Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333-0006
(207) 626-8800
Maine Bar No. 7095

CONSENTED to on behalf of THE MAINE HE ALTH ALLIANCE by:

William R. Diggins
Executive Director,
vx
The Maine Health Alliance
Signed this*/^day of

William R. Diggins
(individually, on his own b
Signed this
is ^ d a y o f _ ^

2003.

e

2003.

ftWayne A. Mack, Esq.
Duane Morris LLP
One Liberty Place
Philadelphia, PA 19103-7396
Attorney for The Maine Health Alliance

Suite 500
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State o f Maine v. The Maine Healu. Alliance et al.
Consent Order

Washington, DC 20005
Attorney for William R.JDiggins
Signed th isjl_ day of

It is ORDERED and DECREED as set forth above.

Dated:

I

riCE, SUPERIOR COURT
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STATE OF MAINE
KENNEBEC, ss.

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION
DOCKET NO.

STATE OF MAINE,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff
v.

)COMPLAINT
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

THE MAINE HEALTH ALLIANCE,
a nonprofit corporation with offices in Bangor,
Penobscot County, Maine, and
WILLIAM R. DIGGINS,
individually,
Defendants

INTRODUCTION
This is an action under Maine’s antitrust laws to enjoin the Maine Health Alliance and its
Executive Director, William R. Diggins from combining or conspiring to unreasonably restrain
trade in jointly negotiating with managed care companies or other payors and to assess costs.
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
1.
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 4 M.R.S.A. § 152 and 10
M.R.S.A. § 1104.
2.
The State of Maine, by and through its Attorney General is authorized to bring
this action seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties for the anti-competitive conduct of the
Defendants under 10 M.R.S.A.§1104.
3.
Defendant The Maine Health Alliance is a Maine nonprofit corporation with
offices in Bangor, Penobscot County, Maine. The Alliance was formed in 1995, and its
membership currently consists of over 325 physicians and eleven hospitals located throughout a
five-county area in northeastern Maine.
4.
Defendant William R. Diggins is the Alliance’s Executive Director, and he has
served in this capacity since its inception. As Executive Director, Mr. Diggins manages the
Alliance’s day-to-day operations, and he is one of the organization’s principal contract
negotiators with payors. Mr. Diggins’ office and principal place of business is located at the
Alliance’s offices in Bangor, Penobscot County, Maine.
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5.
The Alliance’s eleven hospital members are: Calais Regional Hospital, Cary
Medical Center, Down East Community Hospital, Houlton Regional Hospital, Maine Coast
Memorial Hospital, Mayo Regional Hospital, Millinocket Regional Hospital, Mount Desert
Island Hospital, Northern Maine Medical Center, Penobscot Valley Hospital, and St. Joseph
Hospital. Each of these hospitals is a tax-exempt organization. The Alliance is not a tax-exempt
entity.
6.
The Alliance’s approximately 325 physician members include both primary care
and specialist physicians. A substantial majority of these physicians practice in independent solo
or small group practices on a for-profit basis. Some physician members are salaried employees
of an Alliance hospital.

FACTS
Overview of the Market and Competition
7.
The Maine Health Alliance at all times relevant to this Complaint has acted on
behalf of and in concert with its members.
8.
At all times relevant to this Complaint, a substantial majority of the Alliance’s
physician members have been engaged in the business of providing medical services for a fee.
Except to the extent that competition has been restrained as alleged herein, Alliance physicians
have been, and are now, in competition with other Alliance physicians for the provision of
physician services.
9.
At all times relevant to this Complaint, the Alliance’s hospitals have been
engaged in the business of providing hospital services for a fee. Except to the extent that
competition has been restrained as alleged herein, Alliance hospitals have been, and are now, in
competition with other Alliance hospitals for the provision of hospital services.
10.
The Alliance’s general business practices and conduct, including the acts and
practices alleged herein, are in or affecting “commerce” as described in 10 M.R.S.A. § 1101.

11.
The Alliance and its physician and hospital members do business in Aroostook,
Hancock, Penobscot, Piscataquis, and Washington Counties in northeastern Maine (the
“Northeastern Maine Counties”).
12.

Absent agreements among physicians or hospitals on prices and other contract
'Will ‘Hrf'iVlHp
ipeting physicians
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and competing hospitals decide individually whether to enter into contracts with payors, and at
what prices they will accept payment for services rendered pursuant to such contracts.
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13.
The Maine Bureau of Insurance has promulgated access to care regulations
requiring health maintenance organizations (“HMOs”) to make physician and hospital services
available within certain travel times and distances from the residences of the HMO’s subscribers.
To comply with these regulations, an HMO doing business in the Northeastern I.iuine flounties
must include in its provider network a large number of primary care and specialist physicians
and hospitals that provide services in the Northeastern Maine Counties.
14.
To be competitively marketable in the Northeastern Maine Counties, a payor’s
health plan must include in its provider network a large number of primary care and specialist
physicians and hospitals in the Northeastern Maine Counties.
15.
The vast majority of the primary care and specialist physicians who practice in the
Northeastern Maine Counties are members of the Alliance, and more than 85% of the physicians
on staff at the Alliance’s hospitals are members of the Alliance. Eleven of the sixteen hospitals
in the Northeastern Maine Counties are members of the Alliance.
The Alliance Is a Joint Contracting Organization,
and Acts as an Exclusive Contracting Agent, for Its Members
16.
According to its business records, the Alliance was formed primarily to serve as a
“joint contracting organization” for its physician and hospital members, and to negotiate payor
contracts that contain “higher compensation” and other more “advantageous” contract terms than
its physician and hospital members could obtain by dealing individually with payors. Moreover,
as set forth in the Alliance’s 1998 Strategic Plan, its “mission” was to provide Alliance members
with “increased market strength through joint contracting.”
17.
The Alliance’s bylaws provide that physician members hold 11 of the 22 seats on
the Alliance’s Board of Directors (“Board”). The physician members at each of the 11 Alliance
hospitals elect a representative to the Board. In addition, each Alliance hospital appoints a
hospital representative to serve on the Alliance Board. The Board is the Alliance’s chief policy
making body.
18.
The Board, in conjunction with its Contracts Committee, has compiled written
“Contracting Guidelines and Parameters” setting forth price-related and other competitively
significant terms that the Alliance requires when contracting with payors on its members’ behalf.
19.
As part of the process of joining the Alliance, physicians and hospitals sign an
agreement designating the Alliance as their negotiating agent to contract with payors, and
authorizing the Alliance to enter into, on their behalf, payor contracts that meet the
organization’s “Contracting Guidelines and Parameters.”
The Board has authorized Mr. Diggins to serve as one of the Alliance’s principal
details r\-Ç A 11i r>t-»j'-»o Marrnt
,ma report;
negotiating agents with payors. Mr. Diggins
payors, including the status of price negotiations and the specific price levels that are discussed,
to the Alliance’s Contracts Committee and the Board.
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21.
The Board relies on Mr. Diggins’s recommendations in deciding whether to
accept or reject a payor contract on behalf of the Alliance’s physician and hospital members.
22.
In corresnondence with Alliance nhvsirians Mr Devins has described “the
favorable compensation which the Alliance has obtained for its physician members.” Alliance
representatives, including Mr. Diggins, demanded and received payor contracts containing
higher conversion factors used to determine prices for physician services than physicians were
able to obtain through direct, unilateral negotiations with payors. As a result of the higher
conversion factors that the Alliance demanded, the Alliance physicians received higher
compensation for their services.
23.
Alliance hospitals determine their own respective price lists. The Alliance,
representing the hospitals collectively, fixes the maximum percentage discount allowable from
member hospital price lists. In correspondence with Alliance hospitals, Mr. Diggins asserted that
“Alliance contracting has frequently afforded its members better compensation than its
individual hospitals could have obtained unilaterally,” by demanding and receiving smaller
discounts off the hospital’s charges and refusing payor requests to negotiate the hospital list
prices underlying the discounts.
24.
The Alliance and Mr. Diggins, on the Alliance members’ collective behalf, also
have negotiated competitively significant contract terms in addition to price, resulting in higher
compensation than the physicians and hospitals could have obtained without the Alliance’s
collective bargaining power (e.g., large monetary penalties for failure to pay in a timely manner,
and restrictions on how payors utilize software programs to review physicians’ claims for
payment).
25.
Although the Alliance’s rules and bylaws state that its physician and hospital
members are permitted to participate in other provider networks and to negotiate with payors
individually, the Alliance and Mr. Diggins have repeatedly convinced Alliance members to
contract exclusively through the organization. They have done so by, among other things:
a.

urging Alliance physicians, when contacted individually by payors, to
“refer them to the Alliance” to enhance the group’s collective power;

b.

facilitating efforts by Alliance physicians to “roll their [pre-existing
individual payor] contracts through the Alliance” when they came up for
renewal, to benefit from the more lucrative terms that the Alliance
demands from payors;

c.

discouraging Alliance physicians from contracting with other provider
networks, and encouraging those who already are members of other
networks to “reconsider [their] participation” in those networks, to
maintain the Alliance’s collective power; and

d.

warning Alliance hospitals that contracting outside the Alliance will “‘gut’
the organization” and “diminish” its purpose and effectiveness.
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26.
By agreeing with each other to negotiate conceitedly through the Alliance, the
Alliance’s physician members and hospital members have obtained higher compensation and
other more favorable contract terms from payors than they would have by negotiating with
payors individually.
Aetna, Inc.
27.
In September 1996, the Alliance entered into a contract with NYLCare Health
Plans of Maine, Inc., a payor doing business in the Northeastern Maine Counties. In 1998,
Aetna, Inc., acquired NYLCare, and assumed all of NYLCare’s contracts with physicians and
hospitals in the Northeastern Maine Counties, including NYLCare’s contract with the Alliance.
28.
Through contract negotiations with NYLCare in 1996, the Alliance, on behalf of
its physician members, demanded and received a $65 conversion factor, which is equivalent to
approximately 175% of 1996 RBRVS1, for services performed for non-HMO subscribers. For
NYLCare’s HMO subscribers, the Alliance successfully negotiated a $52 conversion factor,
which is equivalent to approximately 140% of 1996 RBRVS. At that time, NYLCare contracted
with non-Alliance physicians for services rendered to all NYLCare subscribers (HMO and nonHMO) in Maine at conversion factors ranging from $48 to $50, which is equivalent to
approximately 130% to 135% of 1996 RBR.VS. The prices obtained by the Alliance for its
physician members were substantially higher than the physicians could have obtained by
negotiating individually with NYLCare.
29.
Since Aetna’s acquisition of NYLCare in 1998, Aetna and non-Alliance
physicians have renegotiated their contracts, resulting in savings for Aetna subscribers. Aetna
currently utilizes conversion factors ranging from $44 to $48, which is approximately equivalent
to 120% to 130% of 2003 RBRVS, for services rendered by non-Alliance physicians to its
subscribers in Maine. Aetna has made repeated attempts to renegotiate the rates that it pays to
the Alliance’s physician members, but the Alliance, on the collective behalf of its physician
members, has refused to reduce the $65 and $52 conversion factors for physician services agreed
to in 1996. As a result, Aetna pays Alliance physicians prices that are approximately 40% to
50% higher for non-HMO subscribers, and 10% to 20% higher for HMO subscribers, than Aetna
pays to non-Alliance physicians for comparable services.
30.
The Alliance’s contract with Aetna was set to expire August 31, 1999. In a letter
dated March 8, 1999, Aetna approached Alliance physicians directly to negotiate new contracts
The Medicare Resource Based Relative Value Scale (“RBRVS”) is a system used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (“CMS”) to determine the amount to pay physicians for the services they render to Medicare patients. Under RBRVS.
the price for physician services is determined by multiplying a dollar conversion factor, set by CMS, by the Relative Value Unit
(“RVU”) assigned by CMS to each physician service (e.g., under RBRVS, a Medicare conversion factor of $35 x 2.34 RVU for a
physician service = an $82 fee). Payors in many areas of the country make contract offers to individual physicians or groups at a
price level specified as some percentage of the RBRVS fee for a particular year {e.g., “ 110% of 2003 RBRVS”). In the
Northeastern Maine Counties, payors negotiate the conversion factor, rather than a percentage of the RBRVS fee, with
physicians. For example, if a Maine payor offers a conversion factor of $42, rather than the Medicare conversion factor of $35.
and the RVU that CMS assigns for a particular physician service is 2.34, then the physician’s price for that service to the payor
would be $42 x 2.34, or $98.28.
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with individual physicians, to ensure that there would be no interruption of service to its
subscribers if Aetna and the Alliance failed to reach an agreement for renewal prior to the
termination of the contract.
31.
In response to Aetna’s attempt to negotiate with Alliance physicians unilaterally,
Mr. Diggins told Alliance physicians in a March 18, 1999 memorandum that “[t]he Alliance has
strenuously objected” to Aetna about its “bold effort at recruiting physicians around the
Alliance.” In addition, Mr. Diggins warned the physicians that Aetna’s contract offer to the
physicians would reduce physician compensation to a conversion factor of $44, which Mr.
Diggins characterized as a “significant reduction in compensation” and one to which Aetna
realized “the Alliance is unlikely to agree.” The $44 conversion factor, which is equivalent to
approximately 127% of 1999 RBRVS, was Aetna’s arrangement with non-Alliance physicians in
1999.
32.
On March 17, 1999, the Alliance’s lawyer and business agent sent a letter to
Aetna, demanding that Aetna: (a) retract its offers for direct contracts with Alliance physicians;
(b) notify the physicians that the Alliance’s contract with Aetna governs the relationship between
the physicians and Aetna; and (3) “return, marked void, to the physician any contract executed
by the physician” in response to Aetna’s offer.
33.
The Alliance physicians collectively refused to deal with Aetna, other than as a
group through the Alliance, and forced Aetna to renew its contract with the Alliance at the $65
and $52 conversion factor rates. Without Alliance physician members in its network, Aetna
would have been unable to maintain a competitively marketable health plan in the Northeastern
Maine Counties and comply with the Maine Bureau of Insurance access to care regulations.
34.
The Alliance’s hospital members also negotiated collectively through the Alliance
with NYLCare/Aetna for a contract. In 1996, the Alliance, on behalf of its hospital members,
negotiated a 5.5% discount from billed charges for services rendered to NYLCare non-HMO
subscribers, and an 11% discount from billed charges for services rendered to NYLCare HMO
subscribers. Both of these discounts were approximately 33% smaller than the discounts that
NYLCare contracted for, on average, with non-Alliance hospitals for the same health plan
products. Since it acquired NYLCare, Aetna has attempted to negotiate with the Alliance for
new hospital prices. The Alliance refused to accept lower prices and has continuously demanded
higher prices.
35.
In 1999, the Alliance demanded that Aetna agree to a 6% discount from billed
charges for all services provided by Alliance hospitals to Aetna HMO and non-HMO
sunscribers. In response, Aetna proposed different rates for different Alliance hospitals, which
provide varying services and levels of care. The Alliance refused to agree to anything other than
a single discount rate for all of its member hospitals. Aetna counter-offered a 15% discount,
which equaled Aetna’s statewide average discount for Maine hospitals. The Alliance also
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the 1996 Alliance-NYLCare contract, which pays Alliance hospitals substantially higher prices
than Aetna pays to non-Alliance hospitals. Without the Alliance hospitals in its network, Aetna
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would have been unable to maintain a competitively marketable health plan in the Northeastern
Maine Counties and comply with Maine Bureau of Insurance access to care regulations

Cigna Healthcare of Maine, Inc.
36.
Cigna Healthcare of Maine, Inc., is a payor doing business in the Northeastern
Maine Counties that contracts with the Alliance for physician and hospital services. In May,
1998, on the collective behalf of Alliance hospital members, the Alliance told Cigna that it must
reduce the discount off hospital charges that Cigna received under its existing agreement with the
Alliance. In December, 1998, having no reasonable alternative but to meet the Alliance’s
demand, Cigna reduced, by almost 50 percent, the discount that it received off Alliance hospital
charges, resulting in substantially higher prices paid to those hospitals.
37.
In August, 2001, four months prior to the expiration date of its contract with the
Alliance, Cigna directly approached the Alliance’s physician and hospital members to negotiate
individual contracts containing price terms to which the physicians and hospitals would agree
unilaterally, not collectively through the Alliance.
38.
Upon reviewing the terms of the contract Cigna was offering Alliance members
individually, Mr. Diggins advised Alliance members that the contract’s prices and price-related
terms were unacceptable, and that they should not accept Cigna’s offer.
39.
Mr. Diggins also provided the Alliance’s physician and hospital members with a
model letter for them to use to notify Cigna that they refused to negotiate individually, and that
the Alliance would negotiate on their behalf. Shortly thereafter, the physician and hospital
members sent almost identical letters to Cigna, stating that they would not enter into direct
contracts with Cigna and that Cigna should negotiate with the Alliance. As the termination date
for the Alliance’s Cigna contract approached, Alliance physician members started to notify
Cigna that they would no longer provide services to Cigna health plan enrollees.
40.
The Alliance and Mr. Diggins demanded, on behalf of Alliance physician and
hospital members collectively, that Cigna continue contracting through the Alliance, and that
Cigna agree to the Alliance’s demands concerning a number of competitively significant price
terms. These demands included continuing the limits on discounts off hospital charges, rejecting
Cigna’s request to negotiate the hospital list prices underlying the discounts, and rejecting
Cigna’s request to renegotiate physician prices.
41.
Cigna was forced to continue contracting with the Alliance on the Alliance’s
collectively demanded terms because, without a majority of Alliance physician and hospital
members in its network, Cigna would have been unable to maintain a competitively marketable
health plan in the Northeastern Maine Counties and comply with the Maine Bureau of Insurance
access to care regulations.
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Anthem Health Plans of Maine, Inc.
42.
The Alliance and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Maine, a payor then doing
business in the Northeastern Maine Counties, entered into a contract in September, 1997, for the
provision of services by the Alliance’s hospital members. The agreement provided that Alliance
hospital members be paid their billed charges, minus a 6% discount, during the remaining
months of 1997, and billed charges minus a 7% discount, for the calendar years 1998 and 1999.
Blue Cross had sought lower prices through deeper discounts, but the Alliance hospitals
collectively refused to alter their terms. The Alliance’s business records show that, by fixing the
discount rate, the eleven Alliance hospitals increased their combined annual revenues by
approximately $700,000.
43.
On June 5, 2000, Anthem Health Plans of Maine, Inc., purchased Blue Cross and
assumed the Alliance contract. Over the course of negotiations lasting nearly two years, the
Alliance insisted that Anthem replace its individual physician contracts with an Alliance
contract, and that Anthem not reduce its compensation to Alliance member physicians under the
existing individual contracts.
44.
In mid-2002, Mr. Diggins told Anthem that the Alliance’s physicians would
terminate their individual contracts with Anthem, unless Anthem agreed to contract through the
Alliance for the physicians’ services, at prices agreeable to them collectively. Concerned about
losing the Alliance providers from its network, Anthem agreed to include the physicians in its
contract, and engaged in several more months of price negotiations. In the midst of the
investigation of the Alliance by the Federal Trade Commission and the State of Maine’s Office
of Attorney General, the Alliance notified Anthem that it could not go forward with the new
contract, which would have included all Alliance physician and hospital members, and agreed to
an additional one year extension of the 1997 hospital-only contract.

Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc.
45.
In early 1999, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., approached the Alliance about
contracting for physician and hospital services, which would allow Harvard Pilgrim to offer an
HMO product in the Northeastern Maine Counties.
46.
During contract negotiations with Harvard Pilgrim, the Alliance demanded high
compensation for its members. The Alliance told Harvard Pilgrim that its hospital members
“have been willing to accept discounts on charges ranging up to 7%,” and “[pjhysician
compensation agreed to has ranged from $47 [conversion factor] to $51 [conversion factor].”
The Alliance’s rates were substantially higher than Harvard Pilgrim’s standard compensation
terms. Nevertheless, Harvard Pilgrim offered the Alliance a 7% discount for its hospital
members and a $47 conversion factor for its physicians, which is equivalent to approximately
.-\~PF__o _..A
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charges for hospital services and a conversion factor of $49.95 for physician services, which is
equivalent to approximately 144% of 1999 RBRVS.
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47.
The Alliance’s repeated demands for higher compensation resulted in Harvard
Pilgrim abandoning its contracting efforts with the Alliance. Harvard Pilgrim approached
individual Alliance physicians and hospitals for contracts directly with Harvard Pilgrim, but was
unable to sign enough physicians and hospitals to create a network. As a result, Harvard Pilgrim
does not offer an HMO product in the Northeastern Maine Counties.
Fraser Paper, Inc.
48.
Fraser Paper, Inc., a large employer in the Northeastern Maine Counties, covers
approximately 2,300 individuals under a self-insured health plan. In 1997, Fraser Paper
attempted to enter into individual contracts with the Alliance physician and hospital members
located near Fraser Paper employees. The physicians and hospitals refused to deal with Fraser
Paper, and told Fraser Paper that the Alliance would negotiate collectively on their behalf.
Confronted with the physicians’ and hospitals’ refusals to deal individually, Fraser Paper entered
into a contract with the Alliance in 1998.
49.
Fraser Paper sought to include only two Alliance hospitals in its network, but,
because of the Alliance’s restrictive policy, was compelled to include all Alliance hospitals as a
condition of dealing with the Alliance. This prevented Fraser Paper from selecting particular
hospitals with which to negotiate for inclusion in its network. Absent the Alliance’s demand,
Fraser Paper could have offered select hospitals access to Fraser Paper’s employees in exchange
for a significant reduction in the hospitals’ prices.
50.
Since 1998, Alliance hospitals have raised their charges for hospital services by as
much as 15%. Fraser Paper made several attempts to negotiate larger discounts off the hospitals’
charges to offset these increases, but the Alliance refused. The Alliance also rejected Fraser
Paper’s offers to negotiate the hospitals’ charges underlying the discounts.
51.
Fraser Paper attempted to contract directly with Alliance physician and hospital
members on several occasions from 1998 to 2001, and to address its concerns over high health
care costs. In each instance, the Alliance physician and hospital members refused to negotiate
individual contracts, and directed Fraser Paper to contract with the Alliance.

The Alliance’s Conduct Has Restrained Trade
52.
The Alliance, acting as a combination of its members and through Mr. Diggins
and others, has restrained competition by, among other things:
a. facilitating, negotiating, entering into, and implementing agreements among Alliance
physicians on price and other competitively significant terms;
b. refusing to deal with payors except on collectively agreed-upon terms; and
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c. negotiating uniform prices and other competitively significant terms, including
uniform discounts from hospital charges, in payor contracts for Alliance physicians
and hospitals.

The Alliance Has Not Created Significant Efficiencies Justifying Its Conduct

53.
In collectively negotiating and entering into contracts with payors, the Alliance
and its physician and hospital members have failed to engage in any significant form of financial
risk sharing or clinical integration. Defendants’ negotiation of prices and other competitively
significant contract terms on behalf of Alliance members has not been, and is not, reasonably
related to any efficiency-enhancing integration among the Alliance’s physician and hospital
members.
The Alliance’s Conduct Has Had Anticompetitive Effects
54.
The conduct of the Alliance and Mr. Diggins, as described above, has had, or has
the tendency to have, the effect of restraining trade unreasonably and hindering competition in
the provision of physician and hospital services in the Northeastern Maine Counties in the
following ways, among others:
a.

price and other forms of competition among Alliance physicians were
unreasonably restrained;

b.

price and other forms of competition among Alliance hospitals were
unreasonably restrained;

c.

prices for physician services were kept above the level they would have
been absent the Alliance’s collective conduct; and

d.

prices for hospital services were kept above the level they would have
been absent the Alliance’s collective conduct.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
Agreement On Fees and Other Contractual Provisions
55.
Paragraphs 1-54 of this Complaint axe incorporated by reference into this First
Cause of Action.
56.
The Defendants engaged in a combination and conspiracy (a) to jointly establish
price, price-related and other competitively sensitive terms in contracts with payors and (b) to
negotiate or attempt to negotiate with payors on these terms.
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57.
The Defendants’ actions have had and continue to have the effect of depriving
payors of the benefits of free and open competition among the physician and hospital members
of the Alliance.
58.
The Defendants’ conduct as described in this First Cause of Action constitutes a
contract, combination or conspiracy in an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of 10
M.R.S.A. 8 1101.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
Refusal To Deal
59.
Paragraphs 1-58 of this Complaint are incorporated by reference into this Second
Casue of Action.
60.
The Defendants engaged in a combination and conspiracy to refuse to deal with
managed care companies and other payors except upon terms to which Alliance members have
collectively agreed.
61.
Defendants’ actions have had and continue to have the effect of depriving
managed care organizations and other payors of the benefits of free and open competition among
physician and hospital members of the Alliance.
62.
Defendants’ conduct as described in this Second Cause of Action constitutes a
contract, combination or conspiracy in an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of 10
M.R.S.A. § 1101.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff State of Maine respectfully requests that this Court:
1.
Declare that the conduct of Defendants as set forth in this Complaint constitutes
violations of 10 M.R.S.A. § 1101.
2.
Permanently enjoin Defendants, their agents, employees, assigns, members and
other persons acting for them or under their control from:
(a) entering into or continuing in any combination or conspiracy to negotiate on
the terms of contracts or any other aspect of the relationship between
physicians and hospitals, and managed care companies or other payors, and
(b) refusing to deal with managed care companies or other payors.
3.
Order the Defendants, pursuant to 10 M.R.S.A. § 1104 to pay the Department of
the Attorney General for the costs of its investigation and its reasonable attorney fees.
4.

Grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
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Dated:

June 1 6,2003

Respectfully submitted,

G. STEVEN ROWE
Attorney General

CHRISTINA M. MOYLAN
Assistant Attorney General
Department of the Attorney General
6 State House Station
Augusta, Maine 04333
(207) 626-8838
Maine Bar No. 7095
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021 0017
- UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
COMMISSIONERS :

Timothy J. Mûris, Chairman
Mozelle W. Thompson
Orson Swindle
Thomas B. Leary
Pamela Jones Harbour

In the Matter of

Docket No. C-4095

THE MAINE HEALTH ALLIANCE,
a corporation,
and
WILLIAM R. DIGGINS,
individually.

DECISION AND ORDER
The Federal Trade Commission (“Commission”), having initiated an investigation of
certain acts and practices of The Maine Health Alliance ( the “Alliance”) and William R.
Diggins (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Respondents”), and Respondents having been
furnished thereafter with a copy of the draft of Complaint that counsel for the Commission
proposed to present to the Commission for its consideration and which, if issued, would charge
Respondents with violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45; and
Respondents, their attorney, and counsel for the Commission having thereafter executed
an Agreement Containing Consent Order to Cease and Desist (“Consent Agreement”),
containing an admission by Respondents of all the jurisdictional facts set forth in the aforesaid
draft of Complaint, a statement that the signing of said Consent Agreement is for settlement
purposes only and does not constitute an admission by Respondents that the law has been
violated as alleged in such Complaint, or that the facts as alleged in such Complaint, other than
jurisdictional facts, are true, and waivers and other provisions as required by the Commission’s
Rules; and

The Commission having thereafter considered the matter and having determined that it
had reason to believe that Respondents have violated said Act, and that a Complaint should issue
stating its charges in that respect, and having accepted the executed Consent Agreement and
placed such Consent Agreement on the public record for a period of thirty (30) days for the
receipt and consideration of public comments, and having duly considered the comment received
from an interested person pursuant to Commission Rule 2.34, 16 C.F.R. § 2.34 (2003), now in
further conformity with the procedure described in Commission Rule 2.34, the Commission
hereby issues its Complaint, makes the following jurisdictional findings and issues the following
Order:
1.

Respondent Alliance is a taxable not-for-profit corporation, organized, existing, and
doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Maine, and its principal
address is 12 Stillwater Avenue, Suite C, Bangor, Maine 04401.

2.

Respondent William R. Diggins, an individual, is the Executive Director of the Alliance.
His principal address is 12 Stillwater Avenue, Suite C, Bangor, Maine 04401.

3.

The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this proceeding
and of the Respondents, and the proceeding is in the public interest.
ORDER
I.

IT IS ORDERED that, as used in this Order, the following definitions shall apply:
A.

“Respondent Alliance” means The Maine Health Alliance, its officers, directors,
employees, agents, attorneys, representatives, successors, and assigns; and the
subsidiaries, divisions, groups, and affiliates controlled by it, and the respective
officers, directors, employees, agents, attorneys, representatives, successors, and
assigns of each.

B.

“Respondent Diggins” means William R. Diggins.

C.

“Respondents” means Respondent Alliance and Respondent Diggins.

D.

“Hospital” means a health care facility licensed by the State of Maine as a
hospital.
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E.

“Hospital system” means an organization comprised of two or more hospitals
where the same person or persons control each hospital in the organization. For
purposes of this definition, the definition of the term “control” under 16 C.F.R. §
801.1 (b) shall apply. Hospital system includes a hospital that is managed under
contract, or is leased, by another hospital.

F.

“Medical group practice” means a bona fide, integrated firm in which physicians
practice medicine together as partners, shareholders, owners, members, or
employees, or in which only one physician practices medicine.

G.

“Participate” in an entity means (1) to be a partner, shareholder, owner, member,
or employee of such entity, or (2) to provide services, agree to provide services,
or offer to provide services, to a payor through such entity. This definition
applies to all tenses and forms of the word “participate,” including, but not
limited to, “participating,” “participated,” and “participation.”

H.

“Payor” means any person that pays, or arranges for payment, for all or any part
of any physician or hospital services for itself or for any other person. Payor
includes any person that develops, leases, or sells access to networks of
physicians or hospitals.

I.

“Person” means both natural persons and artificial persons, including, but not
limited to, corporations, unincorporated entities, and governments.

J.

“Physician” means a doctor of allopathic medicine (“M.D.”) or a doctor of
osteopathic medicine (“D.O.”).

K.

“Preexisting contract” means a contract that was in effect on the date of the
receipt by a payor that is a party to such contract of notice sent by Respondent
Alliance, pursuant to Paragraph VI.A.2 of this Order, of such payor’s right to
terminate such contract.

L.

“Principal address” means either (1) primary business address, if there is a
business address, or (2) primary residential address, if there is no business
address.

M.

“Qualified clinically-integrated joint arrangement” means an arrangement to
provide physician services, hospital services, or both physician and hospital
services in which:
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N.

1.

all physicians and hospitals who participate in the arrangement participate
in active and ongoing programs of the arrangement to evaluate and modify
the practice patterns of, and create a high degree of interdependence and
cooperation among, the physicians and hospitals who participate in the
arrangement, in order to control costs and ensure the quality of services
provided through the arrangement; and

2.

any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing
entered into by or within the arrangement is reasonably necessary to
obtain significant efficiencies through the arrangement.

“Qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement” means an arrangement to provide
physician services, hospital services, or both physician and hospital services in
which:
1.

all physicians and hospitals who participate in the arrangement share
substantial financial risk through their participation in the arrangement
and thereby create incentives for the physicians and hospitals who
participate jointly to control costs and improve quality by managing the
provision of physician and hospital services such as risk-sharing
involving:
a.

the provision of physician or hospital services to payors at a
capitated rate,

b.

the provision of physician or hospital services for a predetermined
percentage of premium or revenue from payors,

c.

the use of significant financial incentives (e.g., substantial
withholds) for physicians or hospitals who participate to achieve,
as a group, specified cost-containment goals, or

d.

the provision of a complex or extended course of treatment that
requires the substantial coordination of care by hospitals or
physicians in different specialties offering a complementary mix of
services, for a fixed, predetermined price, when the costs of that
course of treatment for any individual patient can vary greatly due
to the individual patient’s condition, the choice, complexity, or
length of treatment, or other factors; and
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2.

any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing
entered into by or within the arrangement is reasonably necessary to
obtain significant efficiencies through the arrangement.
II.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents, directly or indirectly, or through any
corporate or other device, in connection with the provision of physician services in or affecting
commerce, as “commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 44, cease and desist from:
A.

Entering into, adhering to, participating in, maintaining, organizing,
implementing, enforcing, or otherwise facilitating any combination, conspiracy,
agreement, or understanding between or among any physicians:
1.

To negotiate on behalf of any physician with any payor;

2.

To deal, refuse to deal, or threaten to refuse to deal with any payor;

3.

Regarding any term, condition, or requirement upon which any
physician deals, or is willing to deal, with any payor, including,
but not limited to, price terms; or

4.

Not to deal individually with any payor, or not to deal with any
payor through any arrangement other than Respondent Alliance;

B.

Exchanging or facilitating in any manner the exchange or transfer of information
among physicians concerning any physician’s willingness to deal with a payor, or
the terms or conditions, including price terms, on which the physician is willing
to deal with a payor;

C.

Attempting to engage in any action prohibited by Paragraphs II.A or II.B above;
and

D.

Encouraging, suggesting, advising, pressuring, inducing, or attempting to induce
any person to engage in any action that would be prohibited by Paragraphs II.A
through II. C above.
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PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that, nothing in this Paragraph II shall prohibit any
agreement involving, or conduct by:
(i)

Respondent Diggins that is reasonably necessary to form, participate in, or take
any action in furtherance of a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement, or that solely involves physicians in the
same medical group practice; or

(ii)

Respondent Alliance, subject to the provisions of Paragraph IV below, that is
reasonably necessary to form, participate in, or take any action in furtherance of a
qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified clinically-integrated joint
arrangement, and so long as the arrangement does not restrict the ability, or
facilitate the refusal, of physicians who participate in it to deal with payors on an
individual basis or through any other arrangement.
III.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents, directly or indirectly, or through any
corporate or other device, in connection with the provision of hospital services in or affecting
commerce, as “commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 44, cease and desist from:
A.

Entering into, adhering to, participating in, maintaining, organizing,
implementing, enforcing, or otherwise facilitating any combination, conspiracy,
agreement, or understanding between or among any hospitals:
1.

To negotiate on behalf of any hospital with any payor;

2.

To deal, refuse to deal, or threaten to refuse to deal with any payor;

3.

Regarding any term, condition, or requirement upon which any hospital
deals, or is willing to deal, with any payor, including, but not limited to,
price terms; or

4.

Not to deal individually with any payor, or not to deal with any payor
through any arrangement other than Respondent Alliance;
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B.

C.

D.

Exchanging or facilitating in any manner the exchange or transfer of information
among hospitals concerning any hospital’s willingness to deal with a payor, or the
terms or conditions, including price terms, on which the hospital is willing to deal
with a payor;
Attempting to engage in any action prohibited by Paragraphs III.A or III.B above;
and
Encouraging, suggesting, advising, pressuring, inducing, or attempting to induce
any person to engage in any action that would be prohibited by Paragraphs III.A
through HI.C above.

PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that, nothing in this Paragraph III shall prohibit any
agreement involving, or conduct by:
(i)

Respondent Diggins that is reasonably necessary to form, participate in, or take
any action in furtherance of a qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified
clinically-integrated joint arrangement, or that solely involves hospitals in the
same hospital system; or

(ii)

Respondent Alliance, subject to the provisions of Paragraph IV below, that is
reasonably necessary to form, participate in, or take any action in furtherance of a
qualified risk-sharing joint arrangement or qualified clinically-integrated joint
arrangement, and so long as the arrangement does not restrict the ability, or
facilitate the refusal, of hospitals who participate in it to deal with payors on an
individual basis or through any other arrangement.
IV.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:
A.

Respondent Alliance shall, pursuant to each purported qualified risk-sharing joint
arrangement or purported qualified clinically-integrated joint arrangement
(“Arrangement”), for five (5) years from the date this Order becomes final, notify
the Secretary of the Commission in writing (“Notification”) at least sixty (60)
days prior to:
1.

Participating in, organizing, or facilitating any discussion or understanding
with or among any physicians or hospitals in such Arrangement relating to
price or other terms or conditions of dealing with any payor; or
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2.

B.

Contacting a payor, pursuant to an Arrangement to negotiate or enter into
any agreement concerning price or other terms or conditions of dealing
with any payor, on behalf of any physician or hospital in such
Arrangement. Notification is not required for negotiations or agreements
with subsequent payors pursuant to any Arrangement for which this
Notification was given;

Respondent Alliance shall, with respect to any Arrangement, include the
following information in the Notification:
1.

for each physician, his or her name, address, telephone number, medical
specialty and medical practice group, if applicable, and name of each
hospital where he or she has privileges;

2.

the name of each hospital and the name and telephone number of the
person at each hospital responsible for that hospital’s membership
relationship with the Alliance;

3.

a description of the Arrangement, its purpose, function, and area of
operation;

4.

a description of the nature and extent of the integration and the
efficiencies resulting from the Arrangement;

5.

an explanation of the relationship of any agreement on prices or contract
terms related to price to furthering the integration and achieving the
efficiencies of the Arrangement;

6.

a description of any procedures proposed to be implemented to limit
possible anticompetitive effects resulting from the Arrangement or its
activities;

7.

all studies, analyses, and reports, which were prepared for the purpose of
evaluating or analyzing competition for physician or hospital services in
any relevant market, including, but not limited to, the market share of
physician services in any relevant market, or the market share of hospital
services in any relevant market;
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C.

If, within sixty (60) days from the Commission’s receipt of the Notification, a
representative of the Commission makes a written request for additional
information, Respondent Alliance shall not engage in any conduct described in
Paragraph IV.A prior to the expiration of thirty (30) days after substantially
complying with such request for additional information, or such shorter waiting
period as may be granted in writing from the Bureau of Competition. The
expiration of any waiting period described herein without a request for additional
information shall not be construed as a determination by the Commission, or its
staff, that a violation of the law, or of this Order, may not have occurred. In
addition, the absence of notice to the Alliance that the Arrangement has been
rejected, regardless of a request for additional information, shall not be construed
as a determination by the Commission, or its staff, that the Arrangement has been
approved. Further, receipt by the Commission from the Alliance of any
Notification of an Arrangement is not to be construed as a determination by the
Commission that any such Arrangement does or does not violate this Order or any
law enforced by the Commission, including, but not limited to Sections 7 and 7A
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18 and 18a.
V.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent Diggins for three (3) years from the date
this Order becomes final, directly or indirectly, or through any corporate or other device, in
connection with the provision of physician or hospital services in or affecting commerce, as
“commerce” is defined in Section 4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44, cease
and desist from:
A.

Negotiating with any payor on behalf of any physician or hospital who
participates, or has participated, in Respondent Alliance, notwithstanding whether
such conduct also is prohibited by Paragraph II or Paragraph III of this Order; and

B.

Advising any physician or hospital who participates, or has participated, in
Respondent Alliance to accept or reject any term, condition, or requirement of
dealing with any payor, notwithstanding whether such conduct also is prohibited
by Paragraph II or Paragraph III of this Order.

PROVIDED, HOWEVER, nothing in this Paragraph V shall prohibit Respondent
Diggins from forming, participating in, or taking any action in furtherance of a qualified risk
sharing joint arrangement or qualified clinically-integrated joint arrangement on behalf of the
Alliance.
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VI.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent Alliance shall:
A.

Within thirty (30) days after the date on which this Order becomes final:
1.

2.

send by first-class mail, with delivery confirmation, a copy of this Order
and the Complaint to:
a.

each physician and hospital who participates, or has participated,
in Respondent Alliance;

b.

each officer, director, manager, and employee of Respondent
Alliance;

send by first-class mail, return receipt requested, a copy of this Order, the
Complaint, and the notice specified in Appendix A to this Order to the
chief executive officer of each payor that contracts with Respondent
Alliance for the provision of physician or hospital services;

B.

Terminate, without penalty or charge, and in compliance with any applicable laws
of the State of Maine, any preexisting contract with any payor for the provision of
physician or hospital services, at the earlier of: (1) receipt by Respondent Alliance
of a written request to terminate such contract from any payor that is a party to the
contract; or (2) the termination or renewal date (including any automatic renewal
date) of such contract; provided, however, a preexisting contract may extend
beyond the termination or renewal date for a maximum of one year if the payor
provides written affirmation of the preexisting contract prior to the termination or
renewal date, and Respondent Alliance has determined not to exercise its right to
terminate pursuant to the terms of the preexisting agreement;

C.

For three (3) years from the date this Order becomes final:
1.

Distribute by first-class mail, return receipt requested, a copy of this Order
and the Complaint to:
a.

each physician or hospital who begins participating in Respondent
Alliance, and who did not previously receive a copy of this Order
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and the Complaint from Respondent Alliance, within thirty (30)
days of the time that such participation begins;

2.

b.

each payor who contracts with Respondent Alliance for the
provision of physician or hospital services, and who did not
previously receive a copy of this Order and the Complaint from
Respondent Alliance, within thirty (30) days of the time that such
payor enters into such contract;

c.

each person who becomes an officer, director, manager, or
employee of Respondent Alliance, and who did not previously
receive a copy of this Order and the Complaint from Respondent
Alliance, within thirty (30) days of the time that he or she assumes
such responsibility with Respondent Alliance; and

Annually publish in an official annual report or newsletter sent to all
physicians and hospitals who participate in Respondent Alliance, a copy
of this Order and the Complaint with such prominence as is given to
regularly featured articles;

D.

Notify the Commission at least thirty (30) days prior to any proposed change in
Respondent Alliance, such as dissolution, assignment, sale resulting in the
emergence of a successor company or corporation, the creation or dissolution of
subsidiaries or any other change in Respondent Alliance that may affect
compliance obligations arising out of this Order;

E.

File verified written reports within sixty (60) days after the date this Order
becomes final, annually thereafter for three (3) years on the anniversary of the
date this Order becomes final, and at such other times as the Commission may by
written notice require. Each report shall include:
1.

a detailed description of the manner and form in which Respondent
Alliance has complied and is complying with this Order;

2.

the name, address, and telephone number of each payor with which
Respondent Alliance has had any contact; and

11

3.

copies of the delivery confirmations required by Paragraph VI.A.l, and
copies of the signed return receipts required by Paragraphs VI.A.2 and
VI.C.l
VII.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent Diggins shall:
A.

B.

For three (3) years from the date this Order becomes final, distribute by first-class
mail, return receipt requested, a copy of this Order and the Complaint to:
1.

all physician groups, hospital groups, and physician-hospital
organizations, other than any medical group practice or hospital system,
that Respondent Diggins represents for the purpose of contracting, or
seeking to contract, with payors for the provision of physician or hospital
services, or that Respondent Diggins advises with regard to their dealings
with payors in connection with the provision of physician or hospital
services, within (30) days of the time that Respondent Diggins begins
providing such representation or advice, unless such physician group,
hospital group, or physician-hospital organization previously received a
copy of this Order and the Complaint from Respondent Alliance or
Respondent Diggins; and

2.

each payor with which Respondent Diggins deals, or has dealt, for the
purpose of contracting, or seeking to contract, while representing or
advising any physician groups, hospital groups, or physician-hospital
organizations, other than any medical group practice or hospital system,
with regard to their dealings regarding contracting with such payor for the
provision of physician or hospital services, within thirty (30) days of such
dealing, unless such payor previously received a copy of this Order and
the Complaint from Respondent Alliance or Respondent Diggins;

File verified written reports within sixty (60) days after the date this Order
becomes final, annually thereafter for three (3) years on the anniversary of the
date this Order becomes final, and at such other times as the Commission may by
written notice require, setting forth:
1.

in detail, the manner and form in which Respondent Diggins has complied
and is complying with this Order;
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2.

the name, address, and telephone number of each physician, hospital,
group of physicians or hospitals, or physician-hospital organization that
Respondent Diggins has represented or advised with respect to their
dealings with any payor in connection with the provision of physician or
hospital services;

3.

the name, address, and telephone number of each payor with which
Respondent Diggins has dealt while representing any physician, hospital,
group of physicians or hospitals, or physician-hospital organization in
connection with the provision of physician or hospital services; and

4.

copies of the signed return receipt required by this Paragraph VILA.
VIII.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each Respondent shall notify the Commission of any
change in his or its respective principal address within twenty (20) days of such change in
address.
IX.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, for the purpose of determining or securing
compliance with this Order, Respondents shall permit any duly authorized representative of the
Commission:
A.

Access, during office hours and in the presence of counsel, to inspect and copy all
books, ledgers, accounts, correspondence, memoranda, calendars, and other
records and documents in their possession, or under their control, relating to any
matter contained in this Order;

B.

Upon five (5) days’ notice to Respondent Alliance, and in the presence of
counsel, and without restraint or interference from it, to interview officers,
directors, or employees of Respondent Alliance; and

C.

Upon five (5) days’ notice to Respondent Diggins, and in the presence of counsel,
and without restraint or interference from such Respondent, to interview such
Respondent or the employees of such Respondent.
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X.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order shall terminate on August 27, 2023.
By the Commission, Commissioner Harbour not participating.

Donald S. Clark
Secretary
SEAL
ISSUED: August 27, 2003
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Appendix A

[letterhead of The Maine Health Alliance]

[name of payor’s CEO]
[address]
Dear
Enclosed is a copy of a complaint and a consent order issued by the Federal Trade
Commission against The Maine Health Alliance.
Pursuant to Paragraph VLB of the enclosed consent order, the Alliance must allow you,
subject to compliance with Maine law, to terminate upon written request, without any penalty or
charge, any contracts with the Alliance that were in effect prior to your receipt of this letter.
Paragraph VI.B of the consent order also provides that, if you do not terminate a contract,
the contract will terminate on its earliest termination or renewal date (including any automatic
renewal date). However, at your request, the contract may be extended to a date no later than
[appropriate date to be filled in by Respondent], but only if the Alliance waives its right to
terminate the contract.
Any request either to terminate or to extend the contract should be made in writing, and
sent to me at the following address: [address].

Sincerely,

[Executive Director of MHA]
Executive Director
Maine Health Alliance
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NEWS RELEASE

ATTORNEY GENERAL SETTLES FEE-FIXING CASE WITH PHYSICIANHOSPITAL ORGANIZATION
JULY 3, 2003
CHRISTINA MOYLAN, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 207-626-8838
The Maine Attorney General’s Office has settled State antitrust claims against the
Maine Health Alliance and its Executive Director, William Diggins. The State alleged
that the organization and its members entered into impermissible collective pricing
agreements and refused to deal with health care purchasers except on collectively agreed
terms.
The Maine Health Alliance (the Alliance) is a network of eleven hospitals and
approximately 325 physicians in five northern and eastern Maine counties. It contracts
with health insurance companies and self-funded employers to provide health services to
their enrollees.
The State alleged that the Alliance’s joint contracting activities resulted in higher
fees than the Alliance’s physician and hospital members would otherwise have been able
to negotiate, causing purchasers of health care services, including health plans,
employers, and ultimately individual patients, to pay more for health care services. The
settlement, which has been approved by the Superior Court, contains an order designed to
prevent recurrence of the concerted actions that the State believes violated antitrust laws.
Collective contracting among competing health care providers is not
automatically impermissible under antitrust laws. Agreements among competitors on
price and other competitively significant contract terms may be acceptable where the
joint activities of the providers have a real potential to increase quality of care and reduce
cost, and where the joint contracting appears reasonably necessary for the achievement of
those benefits to patients and consumers.
The State contended that the Alliance’s collective activities did not meet the
necessary legal threshold. While the Alliance has some commendable programs in place
aimed at increasing quality for patients, the State contended that those programs do not
require joint pricing to succeed. Furthermore, the State alleged that the Alliance and its
members collectively agreed not to deal except through the Alliance.
Attorney General Rowe stated: “We recognize that the health care sector has
some unique attributes that sometimes justify activities that would be condemned as
anticompetitive in other sectors of our economy, particularly in a rural, sparsely
populated state like ours. However, this case reflects our ongoing commitment to
patients and consumers to pay attention to these activities and make sure they deliver
promised gains, and stop them when they do not.”
The Attorney General also praised the efforts and contribution of the lawyers and
staff of the Federal Trade Commission, with whom his office worked closely on the case.

The State has entered separate agreements with the hospital members of the
Alliance.

